Reproduced from
Dawn of a New Era.

INTRODUCTION

When submarine warfare is mentioned it conjures up two dominant images: firstly, the Battle of the Atlantic, an open ocean campaign against the U-boats of the Reichsmarine; and secondly the image from the cold war of the hunt for the Red October, with submarines seeking their own kind in a deadly display of blind man's bluff on the high seas.

It would, therefore, perhaps seem strange to think of a 4500 tonne, or even larger, nuclear powered submarine operating fully sub-merged within half a mile of the beach engaged in a whole range of roles. But that is precisely where the submarine fleets of the world have routinely exercised, playing an important part in the complex scenario which is warfare in littoral waters.

The post Cold War changes in the international security scene have introduced a new focus on strategic thinking, which continue to challenge planners throughout the world. The fact is that the political, economic and military threats to the national interest of every nation can no longer be defined with the clarity which drove military thinking throughout the third quarter of this century. How, then, does this translate into littoral warfare, and what part has the submarine to play?

It is helpful to set out, as a point of departure, an analysis of the nuclear submarine’s unique attributes (many, but not all of which are almost equally attributable to their conventional diesel cousins). These, not inappropriately, have been described as the "Seven Deadly Virtues".

FLEXIBILITY

The versatile and diverse suite of sensors and weapon fits allows the submarine to be deployed under a primary tasking, but capable of switching to different roles at very little notice. Submarine crews are trained to be responsive to the demands of all the roles for which the submarine is designed. Also, the range and sophistication of modern communications systems allows the detailed redeployment or retasking of submerged submarines. Communications is the key element in the full exploitation of the 'virtues'.

MOBILITY

The submarine, and particularly the nuclear submarine, can move quickly forward to operating areas. Once in theatre it can range freely and at speed, thereby adding a multiplying factor in the mind of a potential opponent. This is especially significant in adverse weather, where the SSN's speed advantage over most surface ships is further amplified.

STEALTH

The submarine is a quintessential stealth weapon. Departing discreetly from home waters, she can be deployed into areas which are denied to surface and air forces. Lying off a coast, she can be withdrawn as discreetly as she arrived, permitting withdrawal or redeployment at will, and without obvious provocation or escalation.

All nations recognise the immense value of covert intelligence gathering and surveillance by submarines. These operations can be mounted at all levels of the crisis spectrum. This stealth affords submarines a degree of survivability which is not enjoyed by any other arm and allows them a classic element of military success - surprise.

The sophistication of their communications allows them to be immediately responsive to a developing or rapidly escalating situation and to prepare for the deployment of more substantial and diverse forces should they be required. More subtly, like a minefield, the submarine does not need even to be in an area to affect the deliberations of a potential adversary - the rumour is normally enough.

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AVAILABILITY

The established practice of maintaining nominated submarines at high degrees of readiness to respond in specific theatres has been a proven method of responding to a wide variety of crises and contingencies. When needed one can be there.

ENDURANCE

Since the USS TRITON first circumnavigated the globe, the endurance of the nuclear submarine has been well recognised. Regular operations in the southern hemisphere and the Indian Ocean serve to underline their ability to be deployed at extended range and, once there, to remain on station, unsupported, for prolonged periods. The endurance and self sustainability of the nuclear submarine is limited only by the size of her food supply. This capacity for endurance can be a major piece on the chess boards of both the military planner and the politician.

REACH

Mobility, together with endurance in the SSN, give the politician unrivalled reach in terms of power projection, demonstrated by the presence of a nuclear submarine on station in distant waters. It also gives tangible evidence of commitment and a registration of interest at home. Alternatively this reach can be used to stimulate or reinforce friendly relations and strengthen the resolve of threatened friendly nations.

World-wide deployments of submarines avail the opportunity to foster relations with allies and Commonwealth partners, using the vehicle of mutually beneficial training exercises and allow the cross pollination of ideas and principles. Using a submarine is a cost effective instrument for nurturing foreign policy aims of co-operation and collaboration. However, it must be said that the covert nature of submarine operations and the availability of berths limits the more visible, traditional aspects of this capability - it is the deployed presence rather than the profile which counts.

AUTONOMY

While the submarine can operate independently of other assets, it is a powerful warfare asset in its own right. Modern communications allow access to constantly refined data, give it access to up to the minute intelligence, improved connectivity with surface forces and shore Headquarters, and the ability to intervene decisively in all maritime scenarios, without dependence on other assets for its own protection or projection of capability.

The second step must be to define the term 'littoral' within this context of specialist operating. The definition will reflect military capability in a given situation, rather than rest wholly on geographical factors, reflecting on the ability of the aggressor nation to project its sea and air power.

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